Universities, Joint Ventures, and Success in the Advanced Technology Program by Michael R. Darby et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
UNIVERSITIES, JOINT VENTURES AND SUCCESS










This is a revision of a paper presented at the Western Economic Association International 77th Annual
Meetings, Seattle, Washington, June 30, 2002.  We thank the University of California’s Industry-University
Cooperative Research Program, and especially its Director, Dr. Susanne L. Huttner, for providing support
for licenses to limited use data and development of a “fuzzy matching” algorithm. This support provided for
both the data in IPR/UCLA Archive as well as the ability to match ATP participant companies into it. We
thank Adam Jaffe for advance access to the Hall, Jaffe, and Tratjenberg (2001) patent data through 1996 and
Linda Cohen for thoughtful advice through multiple revisions. We are indebted to a remarkably talented
UCLA research team, especially David Johnson, Wenjin Kang, Qiao Liu, David Waguespak, and Xiaogang
Wu, and also Stephanie Hwang, Andrew Jing, Henry Tang, and Mo Xiao. This paper is a part of the NBER's
research program in Productivity. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the
National Bureau of Economic Research, the University of California, or the U.S. Department of Commerce.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
©2003 by Michael R. Darby, Lynne G. Zucker and Andrew Wang.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text
not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including
notice, is given to the source.Universities, Joint Ventures, and Success in the Advanced Technology Program
Michael R. Darby, Lynne G. Zucker, and Andrew Wang
NBER Working Paper No. 9462
January 2003
JEL No. R21, E21, G11, G12, J14
ABSTRACT
America’s most innovative firms participate in the U.S. Commerce Department’s Advanced
Technology Program (ATP) – those that participated at least once accounted for over 40 percent of
U.S. patents to U.S. entities during 1988-1996. Many firms are repeat participants. ATP participation
has significant and robust effects on innovation in firms, generally increasing firms’ patenting during
the time they are receiving ATP support, when compared to patenting by the same firms prior to and
after the ATP award. ATP participation increases firms’ patenting on average by between 5 and 30
patents per year during the period of ATP participation. This represents a 4 to 25 percent increase
in firms’ patenting compared to the period before ATP participation. Furthermore, joint-venture (JV)
project participation and university participation in a project both appear to have a positive impact
on firm patenting. The amount of funding received by the firm is crucial for single participants, with
the positive impact concentrated in those firms with large grants. Single participants are more likely
than JV members to be small startups for which ATP funding is large relative to the total R&D
budget. For JV participants, participation is more important than the level of funding.
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UNIVERSITIES, JOINT VENTURES, AND SUCCESS 
IN THE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM 
 
MICHAEL R. DARBY, LYNNE G. ZUCKER, and ANDREW WANG 
 
I.  Introduction 
  The Advanced Technology Program (ATP), at the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology (NIST), aims to fund enabling technologies which firms are not likely to pursue in a 
timely way without the ATP. The role of the Advanced Technology Program (ATP) is to 
“bridge” the gap from demonstrating a promising but risky idea to garnering the organizational 
resources to commercialize a product. In doing so, the ATP increases the prospect of commercial 
capture of advanced technology. NIST made its first awards in 1990, based on peer-reviewed 
proposals submitted by either individual firms or joint ventures of two or more collaborating 
firms. Over its ten-year history, ATP has managed over 1000 participants and subcontractors. 
  A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the success of the Advanced Technology 
Program is that it contributes to the success of participant firms: If the participant firms do not 
benefit from the new technology, others are unlikely to adopt it. Hence, as a first step, we search 
for evidence of ATP’s overall impact on firm success. Our second step is to investigate what 
might explain any impact on firm success that we may discover. We consider the effect of 
program design. ATP makes two types of awards — for projects that explicitly involve 
collaboration between two or more firms (and also possibly other organizations such as 
universities and federal laboratories); and for projects proposed by individual firms, with no 
formal collaborative framework. The former we term joint venture or JV projects, and the latter 
we call single participant or SP projects. Our study examines the effects on firms related to these 
project structure differences, and also related to participation by universities (as a full member in 
a JV, or as a subcontractor in either an SP or JV project). 
We evaluate ATP’s effects in terms of overall change in successful patent applications 
during the period of ATP support. Patents are a useful measure of innovation for all ATP 2 
participants: small, privately held firms; larger public firms; universities; and other research 
organizations. During the period 1988 to 1996, firms and organizations that participated in ATP 
accounted for over 40% of all patents granted to U.S. entities by the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO). Firms comprise 88% of the total number of all ATP participants, and account 
for over 80% of all patents awarded to ATP participants. Innovation in “advanced technology” 
and patenting appear to go hand-in-hand for nearly all of the firms and organizations 
participating in ATP. This concentration of technological progress in relatively few firms is the 
stressed by Harberger (1998) and Darby and Zucker (2003). 
  In our view, ATP not only provides funding awards to participants, but also promotes 
“institution-building” in the process, encouraging applicants to establish new organizational 
structures that facilitate innovation and the capture of inventions in technologically advanced 
commercial products. Institution-building takes place in ATP in a number of ways. First, ATP 
supports firms willing to experiment and develop approaches that are novel and at the 
technological frontier. ATP stimulates industry to initiate projects that are higher in risk, with 
greater potential for broader economic impact. Second, ATP encourages cooperation and 
collaboration in R&D activities, among JV partners, and also through subcontracting 
relationships with universities, firms, and other organizations. Linkages that are important to 
innovation and to technology transfer among firms/organizations are emphasized by ATP in 
selecting projects initially, and then also in project review and monitoring activities. 
In social science terminology, the ATP project changes participants’ “social 
embeddedness” in networks of relations with other firms and organizations. While this effect 
may be especially prominent for Joint Venture participants, firms in Single Participant projects 
also note the importance of R&D subcontractors and relationships for achieving project 
objectives. To the extent that ATP project participation enhances firms’ social network for R&D, 
we expect that the impact on innovation outcomes will extend beyond the project level to the 
firm level. Therefore, we assess the impact of ATP at the firm level in a ‘before’ and ‘after’ 3 
comparison of firm-level innovation outcomes. 
The next section develops the analysis of ATP program design as institution building.  
Section III lays out the methodology of our empirical analysis, focusing particularly on panel 
design and sampling criteria and variable construction.  The main empirical results are reported 
in Section IV where we estimate the overall and separate effects of participation and funding 
amount on the rate of patenting by program participants.  Conclusions are drawn in Section V.  
Beginning at page 32 after the main body of the paper is a technical appendix which elaborates 
on methodology, data, and estimates. 
II.  ATP Program Design as Institution-Building 
  The “social embeddedness” perspective on economic behavior of individuals and firms 
emphasizes the social context and interactions of economic actors. In traditional economic 
theory, economic behavior is analyzed in terms of rational choice and utility-maximizing 
individuals or profit-maximizing firms, and relatively little emphasis is placed on specific 
historical and social context. Sociologists on the other hand have emphasized the importance of 
understanding how specific social relationships shape economic behavior and economic 
outcomes. Economic behavior is embedded in a social context, and the characteristics of 
particular social relations affect economic behavior and determine economic outcomes. 
Granovetter (1985) provides a number of useful examples. When disputes arise in business, they 
are “frequently settled without reference to the contract or potential or actual legal sanctions.” 
Instead, personal relationships based on cooperation and trust are important to solving problems 
and reaching agreements. Or when firms subcontract, or make sales or purchasing decisions, 
long-term sustained relationships between firms are often built on ongoing social interactions or 
networks. 
When ATP makes an award and funds a project, the participating firms and other 
organizations establish R&D and business ties, thus extending and enhancing their social 
network for innovation. By fostering organizational interactions, ATP builds the institutional 4 
basis for innovation. From their networks, firms gain access to knowledge and complementary 
expertise of R&D partners, as well as business and marketing resources of partner firms. The 
social embeddedness perspective on R&D and innovation emphasizes that ATP project 
participation is a conscious institution-building process — firms partner under the ATP to 
establish R&D structures that are favorable to high-risk research, and conducive to socially 
beneficial behaviors such as research cooperation and information sharing, in joint ventures and 
in university collaborations for example. 
  We highlight a few types of social embeddedness — social relations that alter economic 
behavior and outcomes — that are particularly important aspects of ATP’s institution-building: 
•  Close contact among researchers in collaborative R&D work. Such relationships are most 
likely to transmit novel knowledge that is close to the knowledge frontier and hence often 
tacit in nature (Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong 1998). 
•  Relaxation of boundaries around the firm, permitted because information gains are expected 
to be sufficiently valuable to the firm to offset any losses (Zucker et al. 1996). The boundary 
permeability allows more flow of information and hence more learning across organizations 
than would otherwise be the case. Boundary design is often part of the strategic arsenal of a 
firm (Helper, MacDuffie, and Sabel 2000). 
•  Development of institution-based trust that rests on institutional structures rather than 
interpersonal or specific characteristics of the other party (Zucker 1986). Two examples of 
institution-based trust provided for by ATP include: (a) Third-party (ATP) monitoring of 
participants’ behavior in Joint Ventures to ensure cooperation (see Zucker et al. 1996); and 
(b) Administrative structures and agreements (e.g., intellectual property agreements, JV 
administrative structures) to increase confidence in successful coordination (see Das and 
Teng 1998). 
We believe that the implicit design of ATP encourages firms to relax their boundaries 
and share knowledge. Actors will contribute more to a collective good when they believe their 5 
action is likely to have efficacy, and when there are norms of fairness that encourage them to 
match the contributions of others (Gould 1993). ATP provides an institutional structure and 
mechanisms that makes efficacy and “fairness” more likely. The gains from research 
collaboration derive from resource exchange in complementary capabilities, information, 
financial resources, and access to particular technologies or science base. ATP provides 
opportunities for firms (and other organizations) to collaborate and realize these potential gains. 
Firms participating in ATP gain from the project, learn from each other, and become better at 
innovating. 
  ATP institution-building is also evident in ATP guidelines for design of projects and 
structuring of partners to produce greater research synergy. For example, ATP encourages a mix 
of JV partners in order to further prospects for R&D success and technology commercialization 
and diffusion: “Joint ventures should aim to include companies of diverse size, including smaller 
companies, and possibly other organizations, such as universities and national laboratories” 
(ATP 1999: 34). And many ATP projects involve universities. Since universities are often at the 
center of new discoveries and their application, particularly discoveries that involve radical change 
from prior knowledge (see Zucker and Darby 1996; Zucker, Darby and Brewer 1998; Liebeskind et 
al. 1996; also Jaffe 1989), university relationships may be a key source of information for many 
ATP projects. 
  ATP has a goal of encouraging collaborations among firms, and between firms and 
universities and other organizations (federal labs, independent research institutes) in the U.S. 
innovation system. ATP encourages formation of JVs, providing potentially higher award levels 
and more years of funding, and encourages JV members to establish governance structures for 
internal management of JVs. ATP’s suggestions for design of JVs tends to relax the boundaries of 
participants’ organizations. ATP in effect opens up boundaries where the ATP project impinges, 
encouraging joint governance and reasonable access by all JV members to intellectual property 
created within the JV. “Spillovers” or transfers of knowledge to other JV members occur within this 6 
enlarged “information envelope” that protects information dissemination (Zucker et al. 1996). In 
particular, internal task routines that are difficult to understand from outside of organizations may be 
transferred (see Nelson and Winter 1982: 123-124). 
  Enlarging effective organizational boundaries to encompass new research collaborations has 
two main effects that cause more information sharing to occur:  (1) JVs make knowledge created by 
one participant organization more observable to the other participants, since internal task routines 
that are often unobservable across organizational boundaries become transparent through joint work 
among scientists, engineers, and other technically trained workers; and (2) boundary enlargement 
may define a new “commons,” an area of mutual benefit around the shared ATP project, which may 
draw in additional shared resources as research effort progresses or shows promise. 
  Our argument is that JV participants, because of ATP’s institution-building process and 
reinforcing project management oversight, operate in — are “embedded in” — a different social 
context or new social structure when they enter a new JV through an ATP award. By becoming 
embedded in the new structure, JV participants derive an informational or knowledge benefit. 
The firms not only have more financial resources through ATP funding, but also have changed 
social relationships (more collaborators and different collaborators, and more intense 
collaborations). These relationships provide intellectual capital, and social contacts that add value 
through learning processes that result in information or knowledge transfer (Hamel 1991; Doz 
1996). Many JVs, for example, come together specifically to apply for ATP funding, and bring 
together firms that have not worked together before. 
Comments by ATP participants in JVs support our argument.  As one JV member notes: 
“Excellent collaborative environment and complementary technical capabilities have improved 
the quality of technical output and effectiveness of the team. There has been tremendous synergy 
between the companies that are collaborating on this project. Each company brings a particular 
expertise that the others don’t have and which would be difficult to develop. Each party is an 
enabler for the others” (Powell and Lellock 2000: 23). Another JV participant states: “Exposed 7 
to new ideas, technologies that would otherwise not have been exposed to. Enabled us to leap 
forward with newer approaches into our architectural design.” For projects that involve 
collaboration, 97% of participants report that the collaboration stimulated creative thinking, and 
86% report that the collaboration allowed them to obtain R&D expertise (Powell and Lellock 
2000: 20).  (See Appendix Figure A2 for additional detail on intellectual property strategies.) 
The new JV learning context also includes firms, universities, federal labs, and 
organizations outside of the JV, organizations which JV partners collaborate with or are linked to 
in some way. These connections multiply access to other kinds of knowledge, which provides 
additional expanded information advantage (see Granovetter 1973, on the strength of weak ties 
in social networks). As one JV member explains: “In general, the collaboration has allowed us to 
contact new potential collaborators and markets. Some of these markets are for new equipment 
using our technology in ways we had not considered. Due to the success of the JV, the various 
members are investigating projects outside the ATP” (Powell and Lellock 2000: 25). 
III.  Methods 
  Institution-building by ATP and the resulting organizational and informational 
advantages held by ATP participants are factors that enter into the innovation process in ATP 
projects. How do we best measure the impact? To assess changes in organizational learning and 
knowledge through ATP projects, we will study change in innovation outcomes, comparing 
‘before’ and ‘after’ ATP. A major purpose of ATP is to increase commercial capture of advanced 
technology. Patents are arguably the single best measure of commercial capture of invention, 
conveying intellectual property rights. Patents are in fact commonly used to protect intellectual 
property created under ATP support: 76% of organizations report that patenting is a primary or 
secondary strategy for intellectual property, with only 12% reporting that patenting is unlikely 
(Powell and Lellock 2000: 43). 
  In the analysis to follow, we assess whether ATP projects have a general effect on 
formation of new intellectual property within the firm. While an ATP project may represent only 8 
one R&D effort among many at a firm, to the extent that ATP changes firm behavior, 
institutional setting, or social embeddedness, the impact of the ATP project may extend beyond 
the project to affect the firm more generally. Our key indicator of impact on firm innovation is 
whether the overall rate of patenting by a firm increases after participation in ATP begins. We 
focus on project structure (Joint Venture vs. Single Participant), and university participation 
(university partner in a JV project, and university subcontractor in a JV or SP project). We use a 
patent count measure based on archival data assembled by Hall, Jaffe, and Tratjenberg (2001) and 
significantly augmented by the Center for International Science, Technology, and Cultural 
Policy (CISTCP) at UCLA. 
  Our first step is to set the unit of analysis. Archival data on patents are generally 
available only for the firm or organization as a whole, and not for specific locations of multi-
location firms. Our analysis of whether participation in ATP has a positive effect on firms is 
therefore centered on the firm/organization as the basic unit of analysis.  Figure 1 shows the 
number of ATP projects and firm participants from ATP award years 1990-1998. Figure 2 shows 
the distribution by SP or JV type for projects and all participants, from ATP award years 1990-
1998. The number of single firm projects is about twice the number of joint venture projects. But 
because joint ventures involve multiple participants, the number of JV participants is more than 
twice the number of SP participants. Some firms/organizations have participated in more than 
one ATP project, and some have been in both JV and SP projects.  More detailed description of 
the data is included in the Technical Appendix. 
  Many ATP participants work with university scientists. Figure 3 shows that nearly three 
quarters of unique ATP firm participants have had university partners or subcontractors. Figure 4 
shows the distribution of firms by technology area and type of university participation. We 
establish a hierarchy to define firm participants as JV or SP, with or without university partner. If 
a firm has been a full partner in a JV project from ATP award years 1990-1998, then it is 
considered to be a “JV firm.” JV firms that have had a university as a JV partner or sub-9 
contractor in this period are defined as “JV firm – university partner and subcontractor.” JV 
firms that have had only a university JV partner or only a university subcontractor are defined as 
“JV firm – university partner” or “JV firm – university subcontractor.” The remaining JV firms 
are “JV firm – no university.” Single participant firms are classified as either “SP firm – 
university subcontractor” or “SP firm – no university.” 
A. Sampling Criteria and Panel Design 
  Patenting by ATP-awardee firms is tracked before, during, and after they become ATP 
participants, allowing us to assess patenting performance for periods with and without ATP support. 
ATP participant firms can therefore serve as their own comparison group. 
  For our analysis we include all firms involved in R&D in projects that started by the end 
of 1995. (We exclude some participants involved only in administrative functions, and 
participants involved only in projects cancelled before completion.) Firms enter our analysis 
panel in the year the firm was founded, or in the first year of our panel, 1988, if the firm was 
founded before 1988. We chose 1988 as the first year for the panel to allow for pre-ATP 
observation years even for firms entering in the first ATP cohort (1991). The panel ends in 1996 
because number of patents dated by year of application is our key variable of interest, and by 
1997 the count of patents by year of application becomes truncated because many patent 
applications from 1997 have yet to emerge from the patent process, given that our patents 
granted data ends June 30, 1999.  
  Table 1 presents the panel structure for the two samples of firms. In order to match patent 
data, multiple establishments of the same firm are counted as one unit, even though different 
locations of a firm may be participating at different times in ATP. The first sample (panel A) is all 
firms that have participated in ATP, and the second sample (panel B) is publicly traded firms that 
have participated in ATP. New entrants to the panel, in years other than the first year of the panel, 
are due to founding of a new firm.  Table 2 shows the distribution of firms by size category. 10 
B. Variable Construction 
  Our analysis of ATP impact is based on measurement of changes in patenting success by 
firms during and after participation in ATP. The overall rate of patenting depends on the 
“propensity to patent,” which is affected by the value of getting a patent and the ease of 
obtaining a patent (Griliches, 1990). In recent years, Congress and the courts have strengthened 
patent rights, and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has hired more patent examiners. As a 
result, both the rate of patent application and the speed with which patents are granted have 
increased. A simple before and after comparison of patenting is therefore subject to criticism as 
reflecting trend increases in patenting rather than identifying real program impact. Accordingly, 
we develop a “deflated” patent-count measure, which adjusts for year to year changes in the 
average rate of patenting, measured by average number of “patents per assignee” for all U.S. 
assignees of U.S. patents. 
  All dollar amounts (i.e., ATP award amounts and company cost-share amounts, as well as 
R&D expenditures for public firms) are deflated to 1996 dollars using the Chain-Type Price Index 
for Gross Domestic Product. We construct an R&D stock variable to measure the cumulated “R&D 
capital” of the firm. Annual R&D expenditures are available for public firms from the Compustat 
database. Annual R&D expenditures are cumulated and discounted to produce the R&D stock 
variable. 
  Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis for 
three groups of ATP participants: (1) All firm participants; (2) Public firm participants, defined as 
firms appearing in the Compustat database; and (3) All organization participants, including 
universities and other non-profits in JV projects.  
  The firm size categories used are based on ATP definitions of firm size. The industry sector 
categories are based on ATP definitions of the technology area of the ATP project. These industry 
categories refer to the technology area of the ATP project, and are not comparable to the more 
typical SIC codes.  11 
IV.  Empirical Results: ATP’s Effects on Firm Success 
A. Effects of ATP Participation on Patenting 
  Our basic hypotheses concern the effects of ATP participation on patenting. First, we 
hypothesize that participation in ATP projects has a positive effect on patenting at the firm level, that 
is, that the benefit of ATP project participation extends beyond the project to the firm level. Second, 
we hypothesize that participation in JV projects provides greater benefit to firms than participation 
in Single Participant projects, so we expect the ATP participation effect on firm patenting to be 
greater for firms in JVs. The argument is that JV membership expands and deepens connections 
among organizations, which is “social capital” for firm innovation. Third, we hypothesize that the 
effect of ATP participation on innovation, as measured by firm patenting, is greater if the firm 
has a university partner or subcontractor. This hypothesis derives from studies that have shown 
the importance of academe to science-driven industries (Zucker and Darby 1996, 1998; Zucker, 
Darby, and Brewer 1998; Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong 1998; Jensen and Thursby 2001; 
Thursby and Thursby 2002). 
  We now turn to our main analysis of the panel of all firms that began participation in 
ATP by the end of 1995. In Table 4, we control for firm size and project technology area, and 
then include dummy variables which describe firms’ type of ATP participation in each year. In 
regression 4.1, we see that ATP participation is associated with an increase by 29 in number of 
patents awarded to the firm. An increase of 29 patents represents close to a 75% increase in 
patenting relative to the mean number of patents per year for firms in the sample. In regression 
4.2, we see that ATP Joint Venture project participation has a positive effect relative to Single 
Participant project participation. In regression 4.3, we see that Joint Ventures with a university 
partner receive an additional positive effect on patenting, and in regression 4.4, we see that 
university subcontractors have a positive effect on firm patenting. We conclude that Joint 
Venture participation and university participation are important to higher rates of patenting by 
firms in ATP projects. 12 
B. Separate Effects of Participation and Funding Amount 
  We can extend our analysis by taking into account the total amount of ATP award funds 
received, and also the amount received through JV project awards. In this case, the degree or 
extent of ATP participation (or the intensity of the ATP “treatment effect”) is indicated by the 
amount of ATP award funding received by the firm. Following typical practice, we cumulate 
these funds over time, incorporating a 20% per year depreciation rate, to create an ATP award 
stock variable. For firms that have participated only in JV projects, the total award stock and JV 
award stock variables will be equal, while for firms that have participated in both SP and JV 
projects, the total award stock variable will sometimes be greater than the JV award stock 
variable. The measured effect on patenting of an additional dollar of SP award funding is equal 
to the coefficient on the total award stock variable, while the measured effect on patenting of an 
additional dollar of JV award funding is equal to the sum of the coefficients on the total award 
stock and JV award stock variables.   
  Table 5 reports results for regressions that include size and industry controls, ATP 
participation and JV participation variables, ATP award stock and JV award stock variables, and 
several university involvement variables. Interpreting the regression results is somewhat 
complicated. First, estimates for the effect of ATP participation on patenting must be presented 
by specific category of participant (e.g. JV with university partner) at the sample mean for the 
category. Second, because the ATP award stock variable is a stock variable, the effect of 
participation persists beyond the period of active participation. In Figures 5 and 6, the left bar in 
each pair in Figures 5 and 6 presents a conservative interpretation of regression 5.4 by showing 
the estimated increase in patenting during the sample period for the indicated groups. (The 
estimates of patenting increases per year of participation are computed by multiplying the 
relevant coefficients for ATP participation and award stocks by the sample means for each of the 
specified groups, summing the results, and dividing by the mean number of years of 
participation.) The estimate is conservative in that only about one third of the full effect from the 13 
award-stock variables occurs within the sample period. Even under this conservative approach, 
we estimate that the average ATP participant firm increases its patenting by 34 patents per year 
of ATP participation during the sample period. Thus, even without allowing for the future effects 
of the knowledge created under the ATP program, we find a very substantial effect on patenting 
with one quarter of these firms’ patents during 1988-1996 attributable to ATP participation. 
There is also evidence that the effect on patenting is greater for those firms that partner with 
universities during their ATP participation.   
  Table 6 and the right bar in each pair in Figures 5 and 6 present results from similar 
regressions with fixed effects for each firm instead of industry and size dummies to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. We find an average increase in patenting by 6 patents per year of ATP 
participation during the sample period. This amounts to 4% of these firms’ patenting over the 
entire sample period including all the years from 1988 until they began participating in ATP.   
  Tables 7 and 8 and the corresponding Figures 7 and 8 present results from similar 
regressions for the subsample of firms that are publicly traded. For these firms we have data to 
compute a cumulative R&D stock variable in the same way as the ATP award stock variable. For 
these publicly traded firms, the regular and fixed-effect regressions produce estimates of increase 
in patents by 19 patents and 5 patents per year of ATP participation during the sample period. 
V.  Conclusions and Implications 
We find that patenting generally increases after ATP participation under a number of 
different program and participant variations. ATP participation increases patenting on average by 
between 5 and 30 patents per firm per year of participation, which represents a 4 to 25 percent 
increase in firms’ patenting compared to the period before ATP participation. These estimates 
are conservative since future effects from the ATP project participation are not included, even 
though they are implied in our regression models. Also, joint-venture project participation and 
university participation in a project both appear to have a positive impact on firm patenting. The 
findings of this study support the idea that joint ventures and university collaboration have a 14 
positive impact on innovation. 
Positive effects of ATP on innovation in participating companies are significant and robust 
in the analyses we report in this paper. Our measure of innovation—firm patents—suggests that the 
effect of the ATP project spreads beyond the project and has impact on the entire firm. We may 
interpret this result as evidence that ATP project participation supports firm-wide behavioral or 
organizational changes which foster an increased rate innovation. Alternatively, “internal spillovers” 
of knowledge or other benefits from one project to other projects may also help explain the broad 
firm-wide effects of ATP participation. 
This study considers the effect of program design—project structure and university 
participation—on the innovation success of firm participants. The findings indicate that joint 
venture collaboration and university participation have positive effect on innovation outcomes as 
measured by patents. These results are interpreted from a sociological perspective that 
emphasizes institution-building and social relations as essential to the innovation process. From 
this perspective, ATP as a public-private partnership program fills a role in fostering the 
institutions and social processes that facilitate innovation. 15 
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TABLE 1 
Number of Companies Actively Participating in ATP by Panel Year 
 
A. All Companies 
 
Year  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Total  Organizations  232 245 260 274 285 349 349 350 350 
Entrants to Panel  232  13  15  14  11  64  0  1  0 
Active in ATP  0  0  0  20  71  90  117  341  319 
Inactive in ATP  232  245  260  254  214  259  232  9  31 
 
B. Public Companies Only
a 
 
Year  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Total  Organizations  93  96  99  108 116 122 131 151 151 
Entrants  to  Panel  93  3 3 9 8 7 9  21  4 
Firms Exiting Panel
b  0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 4 
Active  in  ATP  0 0 0 6  36  45  56  149  137 
Inactive  in  ATP  93 96 99  102  80 77 75  2  14 
aPublic is defined as appearing in the COMPUSTAT files. 







ATP Firm Participants by Size 
 
 All  Firms Public  Firms 
 N=350  N=158 
  Freq. % Freq. % 
    
Small
a  195  55.7 57 36.1 
Medium
b  88 25.1 47 29.7 
Large
c  67 19.1 54 34.2 
 
aSmall = less than 500 employees. 
bMedium = 500 or more employees, but less than Fortune 500 or equivalent. 





Descriptive Statistics for Regression Sample of ATP Firms 
 
 All  Firms Public  Firms 
 N=2694  N=1067 
Variable  Mean S. D. Mean  S. D. 
    
DEPENDENT VARIABLE    
Patents, deflated
e  39.35 141.83 87.37 206.93 
    
ATP PARTICIPATION INDICATORS    
ATP participant 
b 0.29 0.42 0.33  0.44 
ATP JV participant 
b 0.20 0.37 0.26  0.42 
JV with university partner 
b 0.08 0.26 0.12  0.31 
JV with university subcontractor 
b 0.11 0.29 0.14  0.32 
SP with university subcontractor 
b 0.07 0.24 0.08  0.25 
Cumulative ATP award stock ($000s) 
a 272.39 748.74 389.78  1020.57 
Cumulative ATP JV award stock ($000s)
 a 132.59 543.65 229.55 773.68 
    
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS    
Small Firm 
c 0.50 0.50 0.25  0.44 
Medium Firm 
c 0.28 0.45 0.32  0.47 
Large Firm 
c 0.22 0.41 0.43  0.49 
Biotechnology 
d 0.13 0.32 0.11  0.30 
Chemicals 
d 0.07 0.24 0.11  0.28 
Electronics 
d 0.14 0.32 0.14  0.30 
Energy 
d 0.04 0.18 0.05  0.19 
Information Technology 
d 0.23 0.41 0.21  0.39 
Manufacturing 
d 0.22 0.40 0.20  0.37 
Materials 
d 0.17 0.35 0.18  0.34 
Cumulative R&D stock ($millions)
 e n/a n/a 1759.78  4605.06 
    
a Continuous variable for firm-year: Sum of monthly pro-rated award amount for firm in 
year. 
b Numerical fraction variable for firm year: (Number of months during year where 
indicator true)/12. 
c Dummy variable for firm (does not vary by year): Size of firm [0,1]. 
d Numerical fraction variable for firm-year: Technology area of ATP project; numerical 
fraction when firm is in more than one project and technology areas of projects differ. 
e Continuous variable for firm-year. 20 
TABLE 4 
Patenting by Type of ATP Participation, All Firms – OLS Regression 
 
Dependent Variable   Patents, by date of application (deflated, one year lag) 
Specification  4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 
Estimation  OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Constant  -50.718*** -50.561*** -48.298*** -50.300*** 
  (10.936) (10.896) (10.897) (10.753) 
Small firm  -13.225*  -10.952  -10.303  -9.924 
  (5.770) (5.770) (5.762) (5.681) 
Large  firm  156.503*** 154.309*** 153.634*** 149.691*** 
  (7.021) (7.011) (7.001) (6.916) 
Biotechnology  55.545*** 57.723*** 53.647*** 59.946*** 
  (12.382) (12.345) (12.384) (12.233) 
Electronics  99.215*** 98.965*** 99.200*** 102.851*** 
  (12.176) (12.130) (12.108) (12.023) 
Energy And Environment  50.194**  54.170***  53.145***  52.123*** 
  (16.643) (16.604) (16.576) (16.350) 
Info./Comp./Comm./Ent.  System  58.400*** 58.643*** 54.854*** 59.365*** 
  (11.095) (11.054) (11.093) (10.954) 
Manufacturing (Discrete)  41.138***  37.514***  34.262**  35.801*** 
  (11.180) (11.166) (11.189) (11.031) 
Materials  50.952*** 49.001*** 47.263*** 48.703*** 
  (11.831) (11.795) (11.785) (11.628) 
ATP participant  28.867***  -4.844  -4.980  -70.538*** 
  (5.701) (9.279) (9.262) (12.422) 
ATP JV participant    48.334***  31.871**  68.127*** 
   (10.520)  (11.625)  (15.131) 
JV with university partner      38.438***  26.327* 
     (11.645)  (11.579) 
JV with university subcontractor        47.057*** 
      (11.545) 
SP with university subcontractor        101.406*** 
      (13.210) 
Adjusted R-squared   0.239***  0.245***  0.247***  0.269*** 
N  2694 2694 2694 2694 
Significance levels: *p ≤  .05, **p ≤   .01, ***p ≤  .001 21 
TABLE 5 
Patenting by All Firms:  Intensity of ATP Project Participation – OLS Regression 
 
Dependent Variable   Patents, by date of application (deflated, one year lag) 
Specification  5.1 5.2 5.3  5.4 
Estimation  OLS OLS OLS  OLS 
Constant -46.904***  -41.265*** -40.674***  -40.404*** 
  (10.960) (10.511) (10.399)  (10.399) 
Small  firm  -11.907* -14.556** -12.329*  -11.577* 
  (5.790) (5.536) (5.498)  (5.483) 
Large  firm  159.125*** 143.168*** 139.682***  138.768*** 
  (7.034) (6.792) (6.740)  (6.720) 
Biotechnology  59.906*** 46.164*** 48.746***  48.063*** 
  (12.408) (11.895) (11.776)  (11.835) 
Electronics 104.810***  79.819***  77.738***  82.578*** 
  (12.181) (11.750) (11.629)  (11.689) 
Energy And Environment  53.224***  38.722*  42.009**  42.248** 
  (16.709) (15.985) (15.836)  (15.789) 
Info./Comp./Comm./Ent.  System  61.732*** 52.236*** 51.705***  50.649*** 
  (11.127) (10.652) (10.540)  (10.587) 
Manufacturing  (Discrete)  44.145*** 40.375*** 35.867***  33.421** 
  (11.215) (10.726) (10.639)  (10.644) 
Materials  52.779*** 45.644*** 42.447***  42.398*** 
  (11.880) (11.356) (11.244)  (11.228) 
ATP participant    -20.843***  -95.280***  -104.890*** 
   (6.365) (11.485) (12.840) 
Cumulative ATP award stock,    0.056***  0.090***  0.083*** 
    (20% annual depreciation, $000s)    (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
ATP JV participant      97.561***  76.474*** 
     (12.632) (15.751) 
Cumulative ATP JV award stock,      -0.051***  -0.045*** 
    (20% annual depreciation, $000s)      (0.010)  (0.010) 
JV with university partner        31.973** 
      (11.208) 
JV with university subcontractor        30.554** 
      (11.254) 
SP with university subcontractor        26.104 
      (14.008) 
Adjusted R-squared   0.232***  0.300***  0.315***  0.320*** 
N  2694 2694 2694  2694 
Significance levels: *p ≤  .05, **p ≤   .01, ***p ≤  .001 22 
TABLE 6 
Patenting by All Firms:  Intensity of ATP Project Participation – Fixed Effects 
 
Dependent Variable  Patents, by date of application (deflated, one year lag) 
Specification 6.1  6.2  6.3 
Estimation  Fixed effects  Fixed effects  Fixed effects 
Constant 38.381***  37.869***  37.815*** 
 (1.087)  (1.079)  (1.081) 
ATP participant  -7.933**  -26.099***  -26.423*** 
 (2.617)  (4.924)  (5.663) 
Cumulative ATP award stock,  0.012***  0.033***  0.033*** 
    (20% annual depreciation, $000s)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
ATP JV participant    21.791***  26.030*** 
   (5.693)  (7.306) 
Cumulative ATP JV award stock,    -0.032***  -0.032*** 
    (20% annual depreciation, $000s)    (0.005)  (0.005) 
JV with university partner      0.552 
     (5.366) 
JV with university subcontractor      -7.500 
     (5.365) 
SP with university subcontractor      0.680 
     (6.540) 
Adjusted R-squared   0.896***  0.898***  0.898*** 
N 2694  2694  2694 
Significance levels: *p ≤  .05, **p ≤   .01, ***p ≤  .001 
 23 
TABLE 7 
Patenting by Public Firms:  Intensity of ATP Project Participation – OLS Regression 
 
Dependent Variable   Patent application count for following year (for patents 
ultimately granted only), US patents/US assignees deflator 
Specification  7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 
Estimation  OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Constant -53.504**  -47.167* -46.005* -46.186* 
(20.015) (19.643) (19.140) (19.207) 
Small  firm  -14.990 -18.182 -18.858 -17.303 
(13.098) (12.858) (12.562) (12.634) 
Large  firm  112.381*** 108.875*** 105.712*** 105.019*** 
(12.656) (12.371) (12.064) (12.062) 
Biotechnology 75.316**  66.516**  75.078***  74.947*** 
(23.841) (23.371) (22.961) (23.085) 
Electronics  168.140*** 147.106*** 142.296*** 147.340*** 
(23.512) (23.240) (22.655) (22.927) 
Energy And Environment  35.455  23.647  19.729  22.630 
(29.801) (29.182) (28.653) (28.717) 
Info./Comp./Comm./Ent.  System  71.224*** 68.329*** 65.698*** 66.442*** 
(20.245) (19.851) (19.346) (19.625) 
Manufacturing  (Discrete)  -4.701 -3.904 -5.763 -5.985 
(20.553) (20.089) (19.582) (19.669) 
Materials  54.413* 48.480* 42.785* 42.536* 
(21.919) (21.429) (20.892) (20.905) 
Cumulative R&D stock,  0.023***  0.021***  0.021***  0.021*** 
    (20% annual depreciation, $millions)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ATP participant    -28.738*  -133.849***  -152.559*** 
 (12.065)  (22.832)  (25.402) 
Cumulative ATP award stock,    0.039***  0.110***  0.095*** 
    (20% annual depreciation, $000s)    (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
ATP JV participant      127.730***  132.109*** 
   (24.264)  (29.901) 
Cumulative ATP JV award stock,      -0.106***  -0.093*** 
    (20% annual depreciation, $000s)      (0.014)  (0.016) 
JV with university partner        11.558 
    (19.331) 
JV with university subcontractor        14.396 
    (19.841) 
SP with university subcontractor        50.318 
    (28.264) 
Adjusted R-squared   0.456***  0.481***  0.507***  0.508*** 
N  1067 1067 1067 1067 
Significance levels: *p ≤  .05, **p ≤   .01, ***p ≤  .001 24 
TABLE 8 
Patenting by Public Firms:  Intensity of ATP Project Participation – Fixed Effects 
 
Dependent Variable  Patent application count for following year (for patents 
ultimately granted only), US patents/US assignees deflator 
Specification 8.1  8.2  8.3 
Estimation  Fixed effects  Fixed effects  Fixed effects 
Constant 92.380***  85.931***  86.577*** 
 (4.411)  (4.510)  (4.588) 
Cumulative R&D stock,  -0.004  0.000  -0.001 
    (20% annual depreciation, 
$millions) 
(0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
ATP participant  -10.445  -35.389**  -21.368 
 (5.871)  (11.792)  (13.797) 
Cumulative ATP award stock,  0.013***  0.044***  0.049*** 
    (20% annual depreciation, $000s)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
ATP JV participant    27.911*  13.507 
   (13.215)  (17.088) 
Cumulative ATP JV award stock,    -0.048***  -0.053*** 
    (20% annual depreciation, $000s)    (0.009)  (0.009) 
JV with university partner      20.598 
     (11.551) 
JV with university subcontractor      -12.424 
     (11.280) 
SP with university subcontractor      -29.199 
     (15.723) 
Adjusted R-squared   0.905***  0.908***  0.908*** 
N 1067  1067  1067 
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We elaborate on five topics: (1) Criteria for inclusion in sample and technology areas; (2) 
Technical details on construction of the panel, including an overview of the panel construction 
process; (3) Variable construction; (4) Outline of data sources; and (5) Additional empirical 
results. 
 
A.1.  Criteria for Inclusion in Sample and Construction of Industry Categories 
Criteria for Inclusion in Sample 
  Table A1 summarizes the criteria we used to select eligible participants.  For our main 
analysis we selected firms only, because of the heterogeneity among non-profit ATP participants 
and the fact that all are in JVs.  In Appendix A.5 below, we briefly examine all organizations 
that are ATP participants to check for potential bias in our results.  Second, the ATP participant 
must be involved in research and development, excluding joint venture participants that served 
only administrative functions.  Third, we exclude participants involved in projects that were 
cancelled before completion.  Fourth, the project must have started by the end of 1996, in order 
to have multiple years of ATP participation for participants entering late in the period.  Fifth, we 
determined year of founding for each firm (universities and other non-profits were assumed to be 
“born” by 1988 since there is no reliable data available).  Firms enter the panel when founded or 
in 1988 if founded before that date in order to be able to distinguish whether no patenting in a 
given year meant that the organization did not yet exist or was in fact not patenting that year. 
  Sixth, still referring to Table A1, we selected 1988 as the starting observation year for 
firms already founded to provide some pre-ATP observations even for firms entering in the first 
ATP cohort (1991) and end the panel in 1996 because we use the number of patents, by year of 35 
application, for patents already granted (the US Patent and Trademark office releases no 
information on patents applied for but not yet granted).  By 1997, the count of patent 
applications becomes truncated because many have yet to emerge from the process given that 
our patents granted data ends June 30, 1999. 
  Table A2 presents the number of organizations in the panel and whether or not they are 
active in ATP by year.  This table corresponds to panel A of Table 1, with the difference between the 
two accounted for by universities and other non-profit organizations. 
Construction of Industry Categories: Technology Area of ATP Project 
As discussed in the text, when examining both public and privately held firms it is 
difficult to develop an industry code for the privately-held firms that will match, or even 
integrate well, with those customarily used for public firms.  High technology industry codes, 
developed and used in the venture capital industry, do not mesh sufficiently well with SIC codes; 
industry categories available in data bases on public firms are not available for privately-held 
companies and have the additional problem of not sufficiently identifying sub-industry 
specialization across the firm.  Further, universities do not have industry coding, though as 
partners in ATP JV projects or as subcontractors to either JV or SP projects universities play a 
significant role in firm success, as our results show.  Accordingly, we used a common “work-
around” by selecting the technology areas of the ATP projects as an industry proxy.  The 
detailed categories are presented in Figure A1.  We used the major bolded categories, except 
Z0000-Other which never appeared in the source data. 
ATP Participants:  Intellectual Property Strategies Planned 
Figure A2 presents additional detail on the distribution of intellectual property strategies 
planned by ATP participants. 
 36 
A.2.  Panel: Construction of the Panel and Integration of Merger/Acquisition & Founding 
Our initial problem was to identify the “patenting entity” and organize the ATP 
information around that unit of analysis--not necessarily the same as the ATP participant name.  
If we found no patents for a particular ATP participant, we were challenged to determine 
whether it was a true zero or resulted from not tracing the appropriate patenting entity.  In 
practice, we found corporate lineage sometimes quite difficult to trace; further, merger activity 
alters that relationship over time.  Panel construction followed these steps: 
Step 1: Identify the Unique Parent Organizations and Link to Patent Assignees 
  This step involved name cleaning and careful tracing of parent entities.  We developed 
and implemented code to filter names and do fuzzy matching with U.S. patent assignees, 
followed by hand cleaning of the match results.  We create a “variant to preferred” name list for 
each ATP participant, locating for example "Regents of the University of California" for the 
various UC campuses and associated federal laboratories. 
 Step 2: Link the ATP Organizations to Archival Firm Data and Refine “Patenting Entity” 
Our refined list of “variant to preferred” names were then matched in to a very large data 
set of archival business information about US firms, including venture capital and new issues to 
cover both privately-held and public firms.  These matches helped to identify additional variant 
names, leading to better selection of the preferred name for the firm. 
Step 3: Determine the Birth Year for ATP “Patenting Entity” 
An organization doesn’t patent before it is founded, except under very unusual 
circumstances (working in a garage with a “virtual firm”).  A firm enters the panel after it is 
founded.  We used firm web sites or resources such as CorpTech and other archival listings of 
firms.  For firms where we could not find a birth date (less than 10% of the total, and only small 
firms), we make the uniform assumption that the firm was born two years prior to its first ATP 37 
participation (see Tables 1 and A2 for births post-1988 entry/birth data).  It would be ideal to 
also clean for firm death, but we did not have sufficient information.  We assumed that 
universities and other non-profits existed throughout the period; once again, our information was 
too sparse to check this except for universities (and all existed throughout the panel).  
Step 4: Determine “Patenting Entities” that Changed Identity With Merger/Acquisition 
We used the SDC merger and acquisitions database, coupled with firms’ web sites, to 
determine the date of acquisition 1988 to 1997, and then determined if the “patenting entity” 
remained the same after the acquisition/merger or changed.  Those that did not change required 
no adjustment, but those that did meant that we merged the two company patenting records from 
the beginning of the panel or founding (if later) in order to track the same entity over time. We 
cannot determine exactly which patents published after the purchase or attributable to the 
acquired firm, and which patents are attributable to the acquiring firm.  In some cases this means 
we also modify the birth year for this ATP parent.  Table A3 presents these data, showing the 
total number of mergers and acquisitions and then breaking out the number that still patent under 
their “old” name and the number that do not—but patent under the new parent name.  Among 
new “patenting entity” parents, it is interesting to note that a sizeable proportion were also ATP 
recipients, suggesting an interesting question for further research. 
Deflated Patents 
  Our framework for analysis of ATP effects rests on measurement of changes in patent 
applications made by companies (for patents that are later granted) during the period they are active 
ATP participants and are receiving ATP funding. 
The overall rate of patenting is affected by the value of patents and the ease of obtaining 
them (Griliches, 1992).  In recent years Congress and the courts have strengthened patent rights 
and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has hired more patent examiners.  As a result, both the 38 
rate of patent application and the speed with which patents are granted have increased.  Thus, a 
simple before and after comparison is subject to criticism as reflecting trend increases rather than 
any real effect. 
  Accordingly, we developed a “deflated” patent-count measure, which corrects for year-
to-year changes in the average number of patents issued to all U.S. assignees of U.S. patents.  
We use 1996 as our base year.  If there were 2.0 patents per assignee in 1996 and 2.4 patents per 
assignee in some other year, firms in our sample that increased by 20% in that year compared to 
the base year would show no change in deflated patents.  A firm would have to have 1.32 times 
as many patents to be credited with a 10% increase (1.32/1.2 = 1.1) and a firm that increased 
patenting by 10% would be credited with an 8.3% decrease in deflated patents (1.1/1.2 = 0.917). 
.  Figure A3 reports data by application year on the total number of U.S. patents granted (up to 
June 30, 1999) with a U.S. assignee at issue and the corresponding deflated patents.  Note that 
the values for 1996 and 1997 show that our procedure also corrects for truncation problems.  
Zucker, and Darby (2003) discuss the deflation procedure in detail and examine several 
alternative deflators. 
  Figure A4 shows that our method of deflation does not alter the basic comparison of 
patenting rates before and after ATP participation.  Deflation is preferred to including year 
dummies in our regression analysis because the logged form of the equation (required to use year 
dummies for widely different sized firms) requires us to make the implausible assumption that a 
$2 million ATP award has the same percentage effect on patenting in a 10-person startup firm 
and large technology firms with hundreds of patents per year. 
 
A.3.  Variable Construction 
To construct panel data, all of the ATP program variables were divided into monthly 39 
proportions, and then summed for the given year.  For continuous variables, such as firm ATP 
award, this entailed first dividing the money that the firm is awarded into monthly allocations 
based on the duration of the project.  If a firm is in more than one project in any given month, 
then the firm's amount for that the month is the sum of the monthly allocation for these separate 
projects.  For ratio variables, such as ATP participation, we started by creating dummy variables 
for each month.  For instance, if a firm is in the ATP in March 1994 we give it a value of one for 
ATP participation for that month.  This value is always zero or one, regardless of how many 
projects the firm is in simultaneously.  We then sum these monthly dummy variables for each 
year, and divide by 12, thus getting the fraction of the year that the firm is an ATP participant. 
  More generally:  Some ATP organizations are in multiple projects, which means all the 
organization’s separate involvements are consolidated when they overlap within the same year.  
For example, the award amount variable in 1995 for a firm in two simultaneous projects in that 
year is the sum of the money given to the firm in both projects that year.  This also means, for 
instance, that a single observation can be both a single applicant and a JV member in any given 
year. 
  The unit of observation in the panels is the firm/year, but we construct those variables 
from monthly observations because ATP projects are started throughout the year.  With this 
method, therefore, we do not overvalue ATP variables for a firm in 1995 whose project did not 
start until November.  For example, the values of ATP variables for this firm would be one sixth 
(2 months/12) of their value if the firm were involved in the program all 12 months in the year. 
  We convert dollar amounts (i.e., the ATP and JV award dollars, as well as R&D 
expenditures for public firms) to 1996 dollars by dividing by the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s 
Chain-type Price Index for Gross Domestic Product (1996 = 1.000) downloaded from the BEA 
site on July 17, 2000. 40 
 
A.4.  Data Sources 
  The data used in this paper come from a variety of sources, all of which except the NIST 
web site are “limited use” data licensed specifically to UCLA or to Zucker and Darby as 
Principal Investigators.  Data about Advanced Technology Program (ATP) participants and 
projects was provided by Jeanne W. Powell at ATP (limited use data) and from our own data 
collection from the NIST web site.  We used COMPUSTAT data for firm R&D expenditures.  
Our patent data (patent applications for eventually granted patents) come from two different 
sources: Hall, Jaffe, and Tratjenberg (2001) patent database through 1996 and from the UCLA-
CISTCUP patent files for 1997-June 1999.  To track individual companies over time, we used 
data on year of founding and identity of corporate parent, as well as dates of mergers and 
acquisitions, from three major data series under separate license to UCLA from the Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC), two supported by UC and CISTCP at UCLA and one supported by 
ATP/NIST. 
 
A.5.  Additional Empirical Results 
Chi-squared Tests for Constrained Coefficients in Tables 5-8 
  Table A4 presents the χ
2 tests for the hypothesis that both the coefficient of the ATP 
award and the coefficient of the ATP participant are simultaneously equal to zero in the 
regressions reported in Tables 5-8.  In every case this hypothesis is rejected at the 0.001 
confidence level providing evidence that even where the signs are in opposite directions the net 
impact of involvement in ATP is significantly different from 0. 
  Table A4 also presents the χ
2 tests for the hypothesis that the coefficient of the ATP 
award, the coefficient of the ATP participant, the coefficient of the JV award, and the coefficient 41 
of the JV participant variables are all four simultaneously equal to zero in the regressions 
reported in Tables 5-8 which contain all 4 variables.  Here the results are mixed:  In the 
structural equations the joint hypothesis is again rejected at the 0.001 confidence level.  In the 
Fixed effects models, dropping all four variables does not increase the sum of squared residuals 
by a statistically significant amount. 
Estimates for Patenting by All Participants including Non-profit Organizations 
  Table A5 compares the descriptive statistics for the panel including all organizations 
participating in ATP with those for the all firms and public firm panels (compare Table 3).  
Table A6 estimates the results for the full sample (including university and non-profit 
participants) and suggests that the full sample is rather like that for all firms. 
Tobit Regressions 
  We experimented with Tobit regressions as a way to deal with truncation at zero so that 
firms either patent so many times or not at all.  The results in Table A7 are similar to the panel 
and fixed effects regressions reported in the text and more difficult to interpret.  Regressions 
A7.1 and A7.2 are the controls only and full Tobit regressions for the all firms sample.   
Regressions A7.3 and A7.4 and regressions A7.5 and A7.6 are the corresponding regressions for 
the public firms and all organizations samples, respectively. 42 
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TABLE A1 
Analysis Sampling Criteria 
 
ATP participants selected for analysis meet the following criteria: 
1.  Companies only first, then add Universities & non-profits. 
2.  Involved in ATP sponsored research and development. 
3.  Not involved in projects cancelled before completion. 
4.  Involved in a project that started work by 12/31/1995. 
5.  Observation years are from 1988 or the birth year of the organization, whichever is 
greatest, to 1996. 





ATP Active Organizations (Firms, Universities and Other Non-profits) by Panel Year 
 
Year  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Total Organizations  294 307 322  336 347 411  411 412 412 
Entrants to Panel  294  13 15  14 11 64  0  1  0 
Active in ATP  0 0 0 25  89  111  138  403  377 




ATP Firms Acquired by Another Firm during Study Period 
 




ATP firms acquired but 
still patenting 
independently 
ATP firms acquired 
by another ATP firm 
ATP firms acquired 
by a non-ATP firm 
and not patenting 
independently 
1991 2  2  0  0 
1992 3  2  0  1 
1993 3  2  0  1 
1994 2  1  1  0 
1995 5  4  1  0 
1996 8  5  2  1 
1997 
b 15  5  3  7 
a Firms in the analysis sample only.  Firms that first start ATP after 1995 are not included in this 
summary.   
b The dependent variable, patent application count, has a one year lead time.  Therefore, although the 
panel ends in 1996, merger and acquisition activity in 1997 is relevant. 
 44 
TABLE A4 
Chi-Squared Tests for Participation Coefficients of Regressions in Tables 5-8 
 
Panel A – Patenting by All Firms:  Intensity of ATP Project Participation – OLS Regression 
 
Dependent Variable   Patent application count for following year (for patents 
ultimately granted only), US patents/US assignees deflator 
Specification  5.1 5.2 5.3  5.4 
Estimation  OLS OLS OLS  OLS 
P
2(2) test for coefficients of ATP award 
& ATP participant both = 0 
n/a 260.90***  151.14***  130.96*** 
P
2(2) test for coefficients of ATP award 
+ JV award = 0 and coefs. of ATP 
participant + JV participant = 0 
n/a n/a  80.86***  57.58*** 
 
Panel B – Patenting by All Firms:  Intensity of ATP Project Participation – Fixed Effects 
 
Dependent Variable  Patent application count for following year (for patents 
ultimately granted only), US patents/US assignees deflator 
Specification 6.1  6.2  6.3 
Estimation  Fixed effects  Fixed effects  Fixed effects 
P
2(2) test for coefficients of ATP 
award & ATP participant both = 0 
54.72*** 53.84***  82.50*** 
P
2(2) test for coefficients of ATP 
award + JV award = 0 and coefs. of 
ATP participant + JV participant = 0 
n/a 2.16 0.22 
 
Panel C – Patenting by Public Firms:  Intensity of ATP Project Participation – OLS Regression 
 
Dependent Variable   Patent application count for following year (for patents 
ultimately granted only), US patents/US assignees deflator 
Specification  7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 
Estimation  OLS OLS OLS OLS 
P
2(2) test for coefficients of ATP 
award & ATP participant both = 0 
N/a 53.14***  102.58***  77.86*** 
P
2(2) test for coefficients of ATP 
award + JV award = 0 and coefs. of 
ATP participant + JV participant = 0 
N/a n/a 0.38  1.34 
 
Panel D – Patenting by Public Firms:  Intensity of ATP Project Participation – Fixed Effects 
 
Dependent Variable  Patent application count for following year (for patents 
ultimately granted only), US patents/US assignees deflator 
Specification 8.1  8.2  8.3 
Estimation  Fixed effects  Fixed effects  Fixed effects 
P
2(2) test for coefficients of ATP 
award & ATP participant both = 0 
20.88*** 50.20***  49.02*** 
P
2(2) test for coefficients of ATP 
award + JV award = 0 and coefs. of 
ATP participant + JV participant = 0 
n/a 3.94 1.48 
Significance levels for all four panels:  *p ≤  .05, **p ≤   .01, ***p ≤  .001 45 
TABLE A5 
Descriptive Statistics for All ATP Participants 
 
  All Firms Public  Firms All 
Organizations 
 N=2694  N=1067  N=3252 
Variable  Mean  S. D. Mean S. D.  Mean  S. D. 
        
DEPENDENT VARIABLE        
Patent applications/US assignees deflator 
 e  39.35 141.83 87.37 206.93  34.59 130.14 
        
PARTICIPATION INDICATORS        
ATP participant 
b  0.29 0.42 0.33 0.44 0.28 0.42 
ATP JV participant 
b  0.20 0.37 0.26 0.42 0.21 0.38 
JV with University partner 
b  0.08 0.26 0.12 0.31 0.11 0.29 
JV with Univ. subcontractor 
b  0.11 0.29 0.14 0.32 0.11 0.30 
SP with Univ. subcontractor 
b  0.07 0.24 0.08 0.25 0.06 0.23 
Cum. ATP award stock, 
    (20% annual depreciation, $000s) 
a 
272.39 748.74 389.78 1020.57 253.00 708.05 
Cum. ATP JV award stock, 
    (20% annual depreciation, $000s)
 a 
132.59 543.65 229.55 773.68 134.42 527.07 
      
ORGANIZATION CHARACTERISTICS        
Small 
c  0.50 0.50 0.25 0.44 0.42 0.49 
Medium 
c  0.28 0.45 0.32 0.47 0.23 0.42 
Large 
c  0.22 0.41 0.43 0.49 0.18 0.39 
Biotechnology 
d  0.13 0.32 0.11 0.30 0.13 0.32 
Chemicals/Chemical Processing 
d  0.07 0.24 0.11 0.28 0.06 0.23 
Electronics 
d  0.14 0.32 0.14 0.30 0.13 0.30 
Energy And Environment 




0.23 0.41 0.21 0.39 0.26 0.42 
Manufacturing (Discrete) 
d  0.22 0.40 0.20 0.37 0.23 0.40 
Materials 
d  0.17 0.35 0.18 0.34 0.15 0.34 
Cum. R&D stock, 
    (20% annual depreciation, $millions)
 e 
N/a n/a 1759.78 4605.06 n/a n/a 
College 
c N/a  n/a n/a n/a  0.08  0.28 
Other Non-Profit 
c N/a  n/a n/a n/a  0.09  0.29 
      
DEPENDENT VARIABLE        
Patent applications/US assignees deflator 
 e  39.35 141.83 87.37 206.93  34.59 130.14 
        
a continuous variable for org./year: sum of monthly awards for organization this year. 
b (number of  months during the year that the variable is true)/12; varies from 0 to 1. 
c dummy variable for organization: does not vary with year.  Size categories defined for firms only. 
d dummy variable for organization: does not vary with year.  Industry (technology area) of ATP project; 
fractional proportion where organization is in more than one project where industry (technology area) 
differs. 
e continuous variable for organization/year. 46 
TABLE A6 
Patenting by All ATP Organizational Participants – OLS Regression & Fixed Effects 
  
Dependent Variable  Patent application count for following year (for patents ultimately 
granted only), US patents/US assignees deflator 
Specification  A6.1 A6.2 A6.3  A6.4 
Estimation  OLS  Fixed Effects OLS  Fixed Effects 
Constant  -38.756*** 33.294*** -38.398***  33.234*** 
(9.305) (0.898) (9.319)  (0.900) 
Small  -11.506*  -10.824*   
(5.023)  (5.014)   
Large  141.140***  140.504***   
(6.155)  (6.143)   
College 11.885    9.085   
  (7.735)  (7.816)   
Other  Non-Profit  -8.227  -8.399   
  (7.420)  (7.409)   
Biotechnology  45.970***  46.016***   
(10.334)  (10.382)   
Electronics  76.316***  79.829***   
(10.366)  (10.421)   
Energy And Environment  38.353**    38.215**   
(13.957)  (13.932)   
Info./Comp./Comm./Ent.  System  48.028***  47.270***   
(9.272)  (9.309)   
Manufacturing  (Discrete)  35.394***  34.048***   
(9.356)  (9.357)   
Materials  40.932***  41.013***   
(9.947)  (9.939)   
ATP participant  -96.880*** -25.453***  -109.492***  -25.799*** 
(10.368) (4.449) (11.646)  (5.145) 
Cum. ATP award stock,  0.092*** 0.032*** 0.084***  0.032*** 
    (20% annual depreciation, $000s)  (0.007) (0.003) (0.007)  (0.003) 
ATP JV participant  96.456***  22.310***  85.996***  25.738*** 
(11.273) (5.033) (14.026)  (6.453) 
Cum. ATP JV award stock,  -0.057*** -0.031*** -0.050***  -0.031*** 
    (20% annual depreciation, $000s)  (0.009) (0.004) (0.009)  (0.004) 
JV with University partner      23.286*  1.875 
   (9.182)  (4.282) 
JV with Univ. subcontractor      19.589*  -7.505 
     (9.102)  (4.316) 
SP with Univ. subcontractor      30.375*  0.744 
   (12.767)  (5.938) 
P
2(2) test for coefficients of ATP 
award & ATP participant both = 0 
191.58*** 100.24*** 167.36***  87.00*** 
P
2(2) test for coefficients of ATP 
award + JV award = 0 and coefs. of 
ATP participant + JV participant = 0 
84.24*** 1.70 62.10***  0.38 
Adjusted R-squared   0.314***  0.899***  0.318***  0.899*** 
N  3252 3252 3252  3252 
Significance levels: *p ≤  .05, **p ≤   .01, ***p ≤  .001 47 
TABLE A7 
Selected Tobit Regressions for Patenting by ATP Participants 
 
Dependent Variable   Patent application count for following year (for patents ultimately granted only), US 
patents/US assignees deflator 
  All Firms  Public Firms  All Organizations 
Specification  A7.1 A7.2 A7.3 A7.4 A7.5 A7.6 
Estimation  Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit 
Constant  -123.576*** -108.821*** -127.008*** -114.169*** -119.759*** -105.723***
  (17.185) (16.152) (24.369) (23.367) (15.552) (14.675) 
Small  -91.899*** -88.128*** -62.888*** -65.121*** -83.742*** -80.896*** 
  (9.598)  (9.053) (16.593)  (16.057) (8.717)  (8.260) 
Large  214.712*** 188.673*** 159.385*** 150.447*** 212.162*** 187.830*** 
  (10.375) (9.850) (15.102)  (14.405) (9.447)  (9.000) 
Biotechnology  111.546*** 89.842*** 135.643***  130.881***  103.681*** 84.559*** 
  (19.756) (18.704) (29.242) (28.241) (17.385) (16.485) 
Electronics  181.755*** 152.260*** 223.177*** 203.665*** 179.371*** 147.366*** 
  (19.274) (18.485) (28.740) (28.312) (17.284) (16.615) 
Energy And Envt.  126.169***  107.339***  112.230***  96.332**  115.978***  95.650*** 
  (25.020) (23.488) (34.470) (33.181) (22.389) (21.129) 
Info./Comp./  54.700**  39.766*  89.654*** 85.006*** 51.099***  37.719* 
    Comm./Ent. System  (17.691)  (16.706)  (24.434)  (23.641)  (15.734)  (14.894) 
Manufacturing   24.445  9.946  -28.215  -26.404  37.714*  26.208 
  (17.926) (16.916) (25.162) (24.095) (15.890) (14.986) 
Materials  60.924*** 46.322** 99.207***  84.866***  57.926*** 44.836** 
  (18.956) (17.805) (26.863) (25.637) (16.953) (15.974) 
R & D Stock      2.751***  2.501***     
    ($millions)      (0.153)  (0.158)     
College       55.024***  50.196*** 
       (11.871)  (11.373) 
Non-Profit       -82.250***  -84.180*** 
       (13.936)  (13.176) 
Cum.  ATP  $  stock,   0.094***  0.098***  0.094*** 
    (20% anl dep, $000s)    (0.012)    (0.015)    (0.011) 
ATP  participant   -94.001***   -135.534***   -97.146*** 
   (19.916)  (30.417)  (18.087) 
ATP  JV  participant   -0.052***  -0.094***  -0.054*** 
   (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.013) 
Cum. ATP JV $ stock    41.240    90.435*    58.565** 
    (20% anl dep, $000s)    (24.864)    (36.602)    (22.086) 
JV with Univ. partner    61.700***    29.441    39.947** 
   (17.413)  (23.405)  (14.420) 
JV with Univ.     48.397**    29.155    26.768 
        Subcontractor   (17.830)  (24.376)  (14.345) 
SP with Univ.     7.307    26.677    16.184 
        Subcontractor   (21.807)  (33.851)  (19.871) 
P
2: ATP Award = 0 and 
ATP participation = 0 
 69.48***  54.64***  86.86*** 
P
2: ATP Award - JV 
Award = 0 and ATP 
part.  - JV part.  = 0 
 36.70***   4.06   43.32*** 
Log Likelihood   -9959.33***  -9859.90*** -5549.21***  -5509.00***  -11868.63***  -11757.24***
N  2694 2694 1067 1067 3252 3252 
Significance levels: *p ≤  .05, **p ≤   .01, ***p ≤  .001 
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